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I. Introduction
This paper was originally prepared for the High Level Panel on Somali 
Refugees convened by the High Commissioner for Refugees to take 
place in Geneva on 13 and 14 November 2013. The Panel is part of a 
Global Initiative the High Commissioner has launched to rally inter-
national support for creative, meaningful and transformative solutions 
for Somali refugees.
Intended to provide context and lay the ground for in-depth discus-
sion by the Panel, the paper overviews the nature, trends and issues 
in Somali refugee displacement in the near region while also touching 
on the pertinent aspects of Somali refugee displacement in other parts 
of Africa, the Gulf and further afield. It provides a brief overview of 
the history and evolution of the estimated 500,000 Somali refugees in 
Kenya, 250,000 in Ethiopia, 260,000 in Yemen, 20,000 in Djibouti and 
20,500 in Uganda while including pertinent information on internal 
displacement. The numbers are large but should not mask the hetero-
geneity within each host country’s refugee population. Some refugees 
have been displaced for three generations; others are recent arrivals. 
Past actions in managing displacement and return in the region are 
reviewed and the conditions facing the Somali refugees examined. It 
becomes clear that varying solutions may have to be pursued for differ-
ent groups and some situations may have more or fewer options than 
others. It is however not the purpose of the paper itself to reveal the 
new solutions. Its principal objective is rather to extract lessons from 
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recent history and, in that context, begin an account of the challenges 
in thinking about durable solutions in the contemporary context.
II. History and Evolution of Somali Forced Displacement
A. General trends
Somalia is often viewed as the scene of ceaseless violence and displace-
ment since the collapse of the state in 1991. However, the interplay of 
conflict and displacement has seen different phases, configurations and 
evolutions. Prior to the genesis of the displacement that has endured to 
the present day, Somalia was itself a major refugee hosting country, the 
home to an estimated 650,000 Ethiopian Somalis from the 1977–78 bor-
der war with Ethiopia. Those most affected were people living close to 
the contested border where the fighting was concentrated. The large 
numbers of refugees in the country contributed to a distortion of the 
national economy as the Government’s use of aid resources as a major 
source of revenue played a major role in incorporating aid into the 
political economy of Somalia, a trend that has continued to this day.
The genesis of contemporary Somali displacement is indicated in 
Figure 1 below which shows the fluctuations in the total numbers of 
people displaced since the mid-1980s. The graph shows peaks in both 
internal displacement and refugee flows during the early 1990s at the 
onset of the conflict and state collapse and between 2007 and 2012 
when escalated fighting and drought conditions contributed to wide-
spread famine and emergency conditions. It also shows periods of 
relative calm when migration slowed and returns to some areas were 
possible.
The first significant refugee displacements out of Somalia started 
with the events that would lead to the collapse of President Siad Barre’s 
regime in 1991. Since then, Somali refugees and internally displaced 
persons have remained the most consistently protracted displaced 
population in the Horn of Africa. However, migration and mobility 
have featured as key elements in the political and economic history of 
the region for much longer. Since at least the 1970s, Somalis have been 
displaced at varying scales in response to different dynamics involving 
conflict, natural disaster, and economic hardship.
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B. Initial phase of Somali refugee displacement: 1988–1991 and after
The principal causes of displacement during the 1990s are usually 
identified as a complex emergency involving conflict, state collapse 
and drought. However, beneath these banner headlines, it is important 
to look for the ways that these dynamics impacted different groups 
within the country. In the build-up to the collapse of the state, the gov-
ernment’s manipulation of clan dynamics made clan identity a princi-
pal source of both security and conflict and access to political power 
(both formal and informal) and resources. The establishment of state 
boundaries in the post-colonial period also meant that many clans and 
sub-clans occupied territory that spanned two countries and thus were 
able to exploit economic, social and citizenship ties and claims in mul-
tiple countries.
Figure 1: Somalia displacement estimates
Source: A. Lindley and L. Hammond (forthcoming 2014) ‘Histories and Con-
temporary Challenges of Somali Crisis and Mobility’ in A. Lindley, ed. Crisis 
and Migration, Abingdon: Routledge.1
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As the state of Somalia began to fragment and collapse, and in the 
period following the collapse, people withdrew into their clans for 
security even as warlords and clan militia leaders fomented hatred 
between themselves and their followers to further their own quest for 
power and resources. Violent clashes between clans, combined with 
the effects of a severe drought, sent people fleeing for safer areas either 
in urban centres in Somalia or to safe havens in neighbouring coun-
tries. An estimated 250,000 people died during the 1992–93 emergency 
and as many as 800,000 refugees fled to Kenya and Ethiopia in 1992.2 
Nearly 2 million people were internally displaced.
1. Displacement to Ethiopia and Djibouti
The civil war that ultimately ousted Somalia’s President Mohamed 
Siad Barre and brought down the government began in 1988 in the 
northwest of the country, the former British Protectorate of Somalil-
and. The rebel Somali National Movement (SNM) mounted attacks 
against the Government of Somalia which for its part staged land and 
air campaigns against towns throughout Somaliland.
In 1991, the number of registered refugees in Ethiopia totaled 
628,526.3 Most of them were from Somaliland and other parts of north-
ern Somalia who had fled this early fighting. The refugees lived in nine 
camps established largely along clan lines with smaller numbers self-
settled in local communities. Significant numbers of destitute Ethiopian 
Somalis from local communities who shared clan ties with the refugees 
also moved into the camps and registered as refugees.4 The camps also 
received some Ethiopian nationals who had originally fled to Somalia 
and were now re-displaced back to their country of origin. However, 
many of the Ethiopian Somalis who participated in this “self-repatria-
tion under duress” settled in local communities.5 UNHCR organized 
an assistance programme to help the returnees integrate into local 
communities. Over 550,000 were provided with cash grants and six 
months food rations.
Fleeing northward from the fighting in Somaliland, over 90,000 ref-
ugees sought shelter in three camps in Djibouti.6 For a country of only 
half a million people and already hosting another 13,000 refugees from 
Ethiopia, this was an extremely heavy burden.
In Ethiopia, refugees arrived on foot in the camps located just across 
the border having traveled for weeks without adequate food or water, 
destitute and now reliant on refugee assistance. It took nearly a year 
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for emergency conditions to subside. High rates of malnutrition and 
mortality in Hartisheik A, the largest of the camps in Ethiopia, were 
attributed to inadequate and irregular rations, high incidence of com-
municable diseases (including diarrhea and hepatitis) and low enrol-
ment in supplementary feeding programmes.7
Even after the initial emergency conditions in the camps had sta-
bilized, life was difficult for the refugees. Relief distributions were 
sometimes sporadic, and most of the camps were located in remote 
areas away from any significant infrastructure or market. Over time, 
Hartisheik camp became an urbanized catchment unto itself, sitting on 
the border near Somalia and becoming a major transit point for agri-
cultural products and imported items from outside the region.
Fighting in Somaliland began to subside in the early 1990s. Encour-
aged by improvements in security and wanting to escape the harsh-
ness of the camps in Ethiopia, an estimated 400,000 refugees returned 
on their own without assistance between 1991 and 94.8 However, 
large-scale assisted repatriation was not possible until 1997 due to a 
resurgence of fighting during 1994 and 1995 in Hargeisa (see further 
below).
2. Displacement to Kenya and Yemen
As momentum against the Somali government grew, efforts to remove 
Siad Barre from power intensified. The conflict spread to Puntland 
and South Central Somalia, causing displacement towards Kenya, and 
from Puntland to Yemen, to accelerate. Between 1991 and 1992, the 
number of refugees in Kenya increased by nearly 280,000. Refugee 
numbers in Yemen doubled from 30,000 to 60,000. Drought in 1991 and 
1992 exacerbated the effects of the violence, and disrupted food pro-
duction, availability of water for human and animal use, local markets 
and income from international trade. Pastoral and labour migration 
had long been “normal” coping strategies but such movement became 
impossible given the fighting going on in the country. This caused 
malnutrition and mortality rates to skyrocket and people to abandon 
their homes. One survey of a displaced camp in Baidoa town found 
under-five mortality rates of 69/10,000 persons/day—35 times higher 
than the emergency threshold—caused by malnutrition, measles and 
dysentery.9
It is important to recognize the ways that the conflict and drought 
affected Somalis with different livelihood backgrounds since this influ-
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enced the composition of the refugee population. While displacement 
was occurring from all parts of Somalia, those from South-Central 
regions were particularly hard-hit, coming as they did from agricul-
tural and agro-pastoral areas and thus relying on access to farmland 
and to agricultural markets more than their northern pastoralist neigh-
bours. The south is also more heterogeneous in terms of clan makeup, 
and fighting between clans often resulted in the seizure of clan ter-
ritories which deprived people of their main source of subsistence, 
making distress migration inevitable. So-called minority clan mem-
bers—members of the Rahanweyn clan group and those who have 
come to be known as Somali Bantu or Jareer were particularly disad-
vantaged, lacking a political voice or armed militias to protect their 
interests. Their exclusion has continued to the present day, and their 
numbers are disproportionately reflected in refugee populations in 
neighbouring countries.
Kenya had hosted approximately 30,000 refugees prior to March 
1991. Within a year, the number soared to nearly 300,000. Refugee 
camps were located close to the border with Somalia and along the 
coast with the Kenyan government reluctant to relocate the refugees 
further inland due to internal security concerns. Emergency conditions 
in the camps prevailed until 1993, with high levels of malnutrition and 
outbreaks of measles, cholera and other diseases causing many who 
were already weakened to die. In 1993, Human Rights Watch docu-
mented high incidences of rape, physical attack and theft in the camps. 
The perpetrators included local populations who were “as indigent as 
the refugee population but…not receiving relief assistance,”10 as well 
as fellow refugees and well-armed bandits from inside Somalia.
Boat crossings from Somalia to Yemen increased during this period. 
Yemen hosted 30,000 refugees in 1991. That number doubled the fol-
lowing year, beginning a long and tragic story involving thousands 
of people drowning or falling victim to unscrupulous smugglers. In 
response to the influx, UNHCR began operations in Yemen for Somali 
refugees in 1992.
Once health and nutrition conditions in the Ethiopia, Kenya and Dji-
bouti camps improved from 1993, donor support began to wane. This, 
together with a modest improvement in security conditions inside 
Somalia and return of the rains, encouraged some people to return to 
Somalia relatively quickly. Between 1992 and 1994, UNHCR carried 
out a Cross Border Operation into areas of southern Somalia in order 
to prepare for and facilitate return. During that period, 360 Quick 
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Impact Projects (QIPs) were put in place with a value of US$7.9 million 
out of an overall budget for return and rehabilitation of $35.6 million. 
It is estimated that more than 170,000 people repatriated during this 
period. Some found return unsustainable and found their way back 
into Kenya (see Lindley and Hammond 2014 forthcoming).
In 1994, six camps were closed in Kenya as a result of the repatriation 
and some relocation of people to the Dadaab and Kakuma camps.11 A 
1996 evaluation of the Cross Border Operation however noted that 
while successful in encouraging people to return the effectiveness of 
the operation was hampered in several ways. Three of the most impor-
tant limitations of the operation were a) the likelihood of deteriorating 
security conditions inside Somalia, thereby triggering fresh displace-
ment; b) the short-term impact of most of the QIPs such that they were 
unlikely to be sustained by local administrations or communities who 
were more concerned with their immediate survival, and c) a lack of 
collaboration with other organizations with a mandate for rehabilita-
tion and development, meaning that “UNHCR in effect launched the 
project alone.”12
Back in the camps in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, the refugees 
who remained adapted to life there, however precarious and insecure. 
Unable for the most part to move legally and freely, seek employment, 
or engage in farming or livestock rearing outside the camps, a sort 
of urbanized, subsidized existence developed. Some refugees found 
ways of supplementing their support from their ration entitlements 
by working informally. Schools and clinics were set up to support the 
refugees. Resettlement to third countries benefitted only a relatively 
small number of refugees.
C. 1996–2006: Relative calm yet a still vulnerable population
From 1996 to 2006, a period of relative calm prevailed in Somalia. The 
number of new arrivals to refugee camps slowed as people relocated 
on their own to urban centres inside the host countries or returned to 
Somalia to try to resume their agricultural or agro-pastoral activities 
or to take their chances in the larger Somali cities and towns. Many 
of those displaced from Somaliland were encouraged to return by the 
establishment of the Government of Somaliland and an end to the 
civil war there. In the southern and central regions, pockets of sta-
bility developed where effective local administrative structures were 
established by communities themselves. What violence prevailed was 
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relatively short-term and localized. However, one of the negative hall-
marks of this time was the entrenchment of humanitarian aid inside 
Somalia as a key resource to be used as both a means and an end to 
obtaining political power. In the absence of government revenues and 
other economic opportunities, those who had access to this resource 
and who could use it to reward their followers, were able to rise to the 
top of the informal political and economic apparatus.13
With the slowing of displacement from Somalia to neighbouring 
countries and recognition that conditions in some parts of the coun-
try had improved considerably, the late 1990s featured a focus on 
organized return of approximately 200,000 refugees14 from Ethiopia 
to Somaliland. UNHCR distributed cash grants, food assistance for a 
period of nine months and limited household items to returnees who 
were supported by the Somaliland Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reinte-
gration and Reconstruction (MRRR). Their return was facilitated by 
provision of hundreds of QIPS between 1997 and 2005. Many of these 
projects have been criticized for lack of sustainability and failing to 
make a difference in ensuring returnees’ access to basic services and 
livelihoods.
Security concerns and lack of administrative capacity prevented 
large-scale return of people from Kenya to South Central Somalia 
although smaller numbers went back from Ethiopia and Kenya to 
Puntland and from Djibouti to Mogadishu. Life after return proved 
particularly challenging given the extremely vulnerable state of the 
civilians and their inability to provide support to their returning rela-
tives. Many people repatriated from refugee camps to Somalia only 
to become internally displaced persons living in destitution in and 
around urban centres. In 2013, thousands of former returnees remain 
encamped in settlements around the major towns of Somaliland and 
Puntland.
D. Renewed Displacement 2006–2012
The relative calm that had prevailed for a decade was shattered in the 
latter half of 2006. The Union of Islamic Courts, which had begun to set 
up an administration in Mogadishu and some of the larger cities and 
which had enjoyed widespread support in many parts of Somalia, was 




This perceived invasion of Somalia by a foreign army served as a 
rallying point for the emerging al Shabaab movement. Al Shabaab 
was a new configuration of hardline militias that had previously been 
active in Wahabist-Salafist movements in the country. It took as its rai-
son d’etre the defense of Somalia against what it called the aggression 
of foreign invaders. The violence began to escalate dramatically from 
the beginning of 2007, with indiscriminate violence particularly in and 
around Mogadishu prompting many people who had managed to sur-
vive in the city for years despite the insecurity to flee, making this the 
most violent period in Mogadishu since the collapse of the state.
People fled in stages, seeking refuge first with their rural relatives 
and, when the coping strategies of these hosts became exhausted, both 
those displaced from the cities and their hosts began the move out of 
the country towards the refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.15
The spiraling displacement from Somalia was compounded by the 
shrinking humanitarian space for aid organizations operating in the 
country and the use of displacement as strategies employed by both 
sides of the conflict. Al Shabaab sought to prevent people from moving 
out of areas under its control which included most of South Central 
Somalia and Mogadishu until September 2011. The Transitional Fed-
eral Government (TFG) of Somalia sought to expand its area of influ-
ence by offering assistance to people in the few places under its control, 
effectively luring them into the areas it administered. As a result, large 
numbers of people poured into urban IDP centres on such a scale that 
the government lacked the capacity to respond effectively. By June 
2012, ICRC reported that there were 368,288 IDPs living in Mogadishu, 
40% of whom had come into the city within the preceding 12 months.16 
Some aid agencies were able to work in areas under al Shabaab con-
trol quietly and on a small scale, although those providing food aid 
and medical support (particularly vaccination) faced resistance from al 
Shabaab which saw their assistance as diabolical.
In 2011, the serious drought that had been building over the pre-
vious two years and the economic effects of the conflict and restric-
tions on movement and trade that had gripped much of South Central 
Somalia for the preceding four years resulted in the emergence of the 
worst famine the region had seen for 25 years. The interriverine areas 
of Somalia (between the Juba and Shabelle rivers) which are normally 
the most productive agricultural areas of the country were the worst 
affected. The use of mobility for strategic interests by warring par-
ties continued: al Shabaab tried to prevent people from leaving the 
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country, attacking refugees on their way to the Kenyan and Ethiopian 
borders, and even carrying out attacks inside the Dadaab refugee com-
plex. The TFG, with support from AMISOM troops, continued to try 
to attract people to areas under its control. These dynamics were abet-
ted by international donor policies that prevented aid agencies from 
disbursing funds that might end up in the hands of al Shabaab, and 
by al Shabaab’s decisions to ban most agencies working in areas it con-
trolled. This effectively meant that most of the areas affected by famine 
were out of aid agencies’ reach.
The result of these combined factors was massive displacement 
within the region: 113,500 new arrivals were registered in the Dadaab 
camps between January and August 2011. In Ethiopia, which had been 
hosting 40,000 refugees in two camps near Dolo Ado during 2009–2010, 
100,000 new arrivals were recorded. (Smaller numbers were being shel-
tered in camps near the city of Jijiga in the east.) The Ethiopian gov-
ernment established three new camps to house them, but emergency 
conditions prevailed until at least three months after the declaration 
of a famine in July. A nutritional assessment of the Dolo Ado camps in 
Ethiopia cited early surveys among the new arrivals showing global 
acute malnutrition (GAM) rates of 50% (15% is considered indicative 
of a serious emergency) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates of 
approximately 23%. Mortality rates for children under five were twice 
the level indicating an emergency, at 4/10,000/day. These indicators 
show how severely weakened the population was when it arrived in 
the camps. It took three months for emergency conditions to subside.17
Arrivals in Yemen also increased dramatically: by between 15,000 
and 20,000 each year from 2005 to 2008 and, between 2009 and 2012, 
from 161,468 to 226,909.18
E. The post-transitional period, 2012–present
In September 2011, al Shabaab carried out a “tactical withdrawal” from 
most of Mogadishu under pressure from TFG and AMISOM forces 
which successfully gained control of many of the larger towns in the 
south over the following twelve months. These gains were accompa-
nied by a political process that brought about an end to the transitional 
period and the selection of a new Parliament, President, Prime Minis-
ter and Cabinet. In November 2012, al Shabaab’s final remaining urban 




At the time of writing, the Somali Federal Government with the 
support of AMISOM is in control of the major urban areas in South 
Central Somalia. Al Shabaab however still controls large swathes of 
rural territory. Through regular attacks in Mogadishu, Kismayo and 
other cities in Somalia, as well as attacks in Kenya and Uganda, it has 
demonstrated that it is still a regional security threat.
Following the ejection of al Shabaab from Kismayo in September 
2012, a power struggle ensued over the administration of Jubbaland, 
an area of southwestern Somalia which lies along the Kenya border. A 
fragile agreement is in place between the Somali Federal Government 
and Ahmed Madoobe, leader of the Ras Kambooni militia, which gives 
him authority as President of the region with some oversight by the 
SFG. There is some hope that greater security in Jubbaland may make 
it possible for refugees to return to that area and that the area may also 
act as a buffer zone supporting people who might otherwise seek ref-
uge in Kenya. While this vision may hold some merit for the long term, 
the questions about exactly what the relationship will be between the 
SFG and the regional administration have not been settled. Until these 
relationships are agreed to, it will not be possible to put in place the 
necessary services and to ensure that relief and development organi-
zations have access to the area to support eventual large-scale return. 
These challenges of realizing a functioning federal system are also key 
to promoting governance and return in other areas.
Despite the challenges the new government faces, the post-transition 
period has brought renewed optimism about the future of the country. 
New arrivals in neighbouring countries have slowed to a trickle. Host 
countries, encouraged by the SFG’s successes and in response to public 
pressure over the terrorist attacks for which Al Shabaab has claimed 
responsibility, have pushed for the acceleration of mass return of the 
refugees. Perhaps out of optimism, but also likely in reaction to grow-
ing intolerance towards them and to the insecurity they have experi-
enced in the refugee camps (see below), many refugees are preparing 
themselves for the possibility of some form of return. As will be dis-
cussed below, significant obstacles to realizing this ambition remain.
Since the escalation of displacement within the region, Yemen has 
continued to be a major destination for not only Somali nationals but 
also people of other nationalities who use the Somali ports to cross the 
Gulf of Aden. In 2012, three quarters of the more than 100,000 arriv-
als in Yemen from Somalia were Ethiopian nationals.19 Yet, when the 
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violence in Somalia was at its peak, most of the arrivals in Yemen were 
Somali.
The crossing from Bosasso and other smaller Somali ports is notori-
ously treacherous. People travel in small, often unseaworthy vessels. 
They are often at the mercy of unscrupulous smugglers who aban-
don them at sea or push them into the water just off the coast. The 
Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat reported that between 2010 and 
2013 “hundreds of people have been reported drowned or killed by 
smugglers. Upon arrival, some migrants report being held hostage in 
Yemen by the smugglers demanding extra payment/ransom. Equally 
there are reports of coercion, rape, murder, kidnapping, extortion and 
physical assault.” RMMS reports that reported drowning and killings 
have decreased significantly in 2013 but cases of kidnappings have 
risen dramatically. It concludes: “There may be a case to argue that 
the change could be attributed to the rising cases of kidnapping of 
migrants for ransom, which makes them of more value alive.”20
Many of those who make it from Somalia to Yemen intend to move 
further into Saudi Arabia but find themselves stranded at the border. 
By 2013, 25,000 migrants, many of them Somali, were stranded at the 
border town of Haradh. Many Somali refugees who remain in the 
country move into the capital city, Sana’a, to search for work. There, 
they must compete with other refugees including new arrivals from 
Syria, as well as with internally displaced Yemenis and poor local resi-
dents.
III. Current Refugee Situation
Today, it is estimated that 1.5 million out of a total population of 
approximately 10 million Somali nationals live outside the country in 
what may be termed both the “near” and “far” diasporas. Approxi-
mately 1 million of those people live in or close to the Horn of Africa 
Region. The current Somali refugee populations in the main host coun-
tries can be seen in the table below:
A. Life for Somalis in Refugee Camps in the Region
Except for Yemen, across the region, camps have emerged as the prin-
cipal model for accommodating and dealing with the Somali refugees. 
This has been not least because of the sheer magnitude of the problems. 
At the same time, encampment is considered necessary to minimize the 
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perceived security risks associated with the refugees or the spillover 
of the conflict from Somalia. Local integration of the refugees faces 
various legal, official and practical obstacles, including, particularly, 
in those cases where it is not officially allowed. The security services 
of the host countries have maintained responsibility for security in the 
refugee camps. In Kenya, with overall responsibility to co-ordinate the 
response having initially been delegated to UNHCR, the Government 
has increasingly taken over primary responsibility for managing the 
situation with the passage of the country’s Refugee Act in 2006. Ethio-
pia has historically managed the security and administration of its 
refugee camps through its Administration for Refugee and Returnee 
Affairs (ARRA), which is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with 
funding from UNHCR and supported by NGO implementing partners. 
Djibouti’s National Eligibility Commission processes asylum claims 
but UNHCR provides most funding and logistical support to refugees.
Camps in Ethiopia and Kenya are located far from urban areas and 
refugees have faced significant constraints to their movement and their 
ability to support themselves through employment or production. As 
the capacity of the camps has been exceeded, opening new camps for 
Somalis has in some cases proved a slow and difficult process as host 
countries worry about the possibility that refugees will not repatriate 
quickly and will bring security problems with them.
The Dadaab and Kakuma camps, which in 2013 were the two 
remaining refugee camp complexes in Kenya, were established in 
the early 1990s to cope with the influx of refugees from the region. 
Dadaab was originally intended to house no more than 90,000 people 
but quickly filled beyond capacity to become for a time the world’s 
largest refugee camp complex. Kakuma in northwest Kenya, which 
hosted not only Somali refugees but also those from Sudan and Ethio-
pia, was also strained beyond its ability to effectively serve refugees 
living there. Following the increased influxes in 2011, the Government 
Bildhaan  Vol. 13
68
opened three new camps (Ifo 2 East, Ifo 2 West and Kambioos) in the 
Dadaab complex, but is still not able to adequately provide for the 
needs of all refugees there.
In Ethiopia, refugees are housed in camps near the southern town 
of Dolo Ado across the border from Somalia’s Gedo Region. The camps 
are cut off from communications and trade networks and are not 
endowed with the social service and physical infrastructure that other 
camps in the region may take for granted.
There are significant clan differences between the inhabitants of 
the camps in the different host countries. In Kenya, more than half of 
Dadaab’s residents belong to one of the Darod sub-clans, with 12% 
each belonging to Dir and Hawiye and 6% Bantu. One third of Kaku-
ma’s population is reported to be Bantu, 20% Hawiye and less than one 
quarter Darod.21 In Ethiopia, it is estimated that 60% of the 2011–12 
arrivals in Dolo Ado were from the Digil-Rahanweyn clan, which is 
looked down on by the other “majority clans.” The host population 
around the Dolo Ado camps is not from the same clans, although 
some speak the same dialect of Af-May, which limits opportunities for 
local integration or self-settlement. In Yemen, minority groups are also 
heavily represented.
It is estimated that there are slightly more women in the camps than 
men, and that more than half of the refugees living in the camps in 
Kenya are under 18 years of age.22 Approximately 10,000 refugees are 
reportedly “third generation”—they and their parents were born in 
the camps, and their families have lived there for two decades. These 
refugees have very different types of experiences and expectations 
of the future than those who have come to the camps more recently. 
Those who have lived in the camps for prolonged periods are less 
likely to have property and active social ties to return to. They have 
become urbanized through camp life to such an extent that it may no 
longer be reasonable to expect them to contemplate returning to Soma-
lia to adopt rural (pastoral, agro-pastoral or agricultural) livelihoods. 
At the same time, most lack the education and skills to be able to find 
employment in urban areas even if such jobs were to exist—which at 
the present time they clearly do not. Refugees have expressed a desire 
for vocational training in the refugee camps in preparation for their 
onward movement (whether to their country of origin or to other des-
tinations). Those who arrived in 2011 had significantly less education 




For those living in the camps, life is a waiting game. As noted above, 
refugees are typically restricted in working or traveling outside the 
camps, although many do try to eke out a living through petty trade 
or employment in small businesses. Security in the camps in Kenya in 
particular has been a profound challenge: attacks on refugees and aid 
workers by al Shabaab as well as nonaligned bandits are a frequent 
phenomenon and have resulted in momentary suspension or restric-
tion of assistance operations. A 2013 report by the Heritage Institute 
for Policy Studies, a think-tank based in Mogadishu, found that many 
of the estimated 15,000 refugees who have returned from Kenya in the 
past year were prompted more by refugees’ concern about insecurity 
in the camps than by optimism about the conditions facing them inside 
Somalia on their return.24
Although the vast majority of the region’s refugees have been camp 
dwellers, no account of displacement from Somalia would be complete 
without considering “self-settlement.” Large Somali refugee popula-
tions, partly in response to the insecurity within the camps as well as 
to avoid the livelihood challenges that camp life entails, have chosen to 
go without significant international refugee assistance and settle within 
urban areas of the host countries. In Kenya in 2011, it was estimated 
that 100,000 Somali refugees were living in Nairobi. Large numbers 
were also living in Mombasa and other cities, as well as throughout 
rural communities in the northeast of the country. A directive by the 
Kenyan government in 2012 for all refugees living in towns in Kenya to 
be relocated to the camps was overturned by the Kenyan High Court 
but is now under appeal.
In Ethiopia in 2009, it was estimated that 160,000 refugees were liv-
ing in Addis Ababa and other Ethiopian towns, unregistered and with-
out assistance.25 No attempt has been made to officially accommodate 
refugees in urban areas of the country.
An alternative model to hosting refugees can be seen in Uganda, 
where refugees are ableto move freely between camps and urban 
areas. Omata and Kaplan cite figures of 23,669 Somali refugees living 
in Uganda—11,007 in the Nakivale refugee camp and the remaining 
12,662 in the capital city, Kampala. Refugees in camps are given access 
to farmland: some farm it while others rent it out to other farmers. 
Refugees in the camps and cities draw on their social ties to facilitate 
trade and build businesses and have been relatively successful at pro-
viding for themselves. This model of relatively freer movement and 
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access to economic activities may be a useful model for other countries 
to consider.
In all of the host countries, most self-settled refugees lack proof 
of legal status. They face difficulty in finding formal employment, 
accessing social services, and securing legal redress, effectively living 
as stateless individuals. Undocumented Somalis living in cities face a 
precarious situation. There is increasing resentment on the part of host 
country citizens towards them especially following the attacks through-
out the region for which al Shabaab has claimed responsibility. In the 
Kenyan capital, the September 2013 attack on the Westgate Shopping 
Centre was the worst but certainly not the first such example. Attacks 
have also been carried out in Mombasa and in the northern districts of 
Garissa and Wajir. In Uganda, an attack was carried out in 2010 on a 
crowded restaurant during the World Cup final. Local populations in 
all of the host countries also feel that Somalis place a burden on urban 
social services infrastructure and house prices. In recent months, there 
have been increased calls by the public for the Kenyan government to 
move towards sending refugees back to Somalia as soon as possible.26
B. Internally displaced persons
There are an estimated 1.1 million internally displaced persons living 
inside Somalia at the moment27—most in inhospitable conditions in 
urban areas. Three hundred thousand are living in squalid conditions 
in Mogadishu.
Reports of IDPs being the victims of theft, looting, assault and sex-
ual violence—including at the hands of security forces charged with 
protecting them—are widespread, and providing effective protection 
and assistance is a huge challenge for the government and aid agen-
cies. Hundreds of thousands more displaced are living in areas outside 
government control and are thus out of reach of most aid agencies.
In January 2013, the SFG announced a plan to relocate people from 
the IDP settlements near the city centre to new camps on the out-
skirts of the city to enable reconstruction of the main business districts. 
Implementation of the plan has been slowed (but not stopped) due to 
protests on the part of the displaced, those who claim a right to the 
land being used for the new settlements, and by human rights groups 
as well on the grounds that security conditions and infrastructure were 
inadequate to receive people.
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Return of IDPs is hampered by continued insecurity in the areas of 
origin as well as the fact that many people have lost their access to land 
and/or property and therefore lack the means to support themselves in 
rural areas. They also know that if they return to their areas of origin 
they will not be able to access most forms of humanitarian assistance 
and thus remain in the displaced centres despite the poor conditions 
there.
Solutions for returning refugees will need to be considered together 
with those for IDPs if those returning are to avoid becoming displaced 
in their country of origin or being forced to compete with IDPs for 
meager resources.
C. Global dimension of Somali displacement: A transnational 
community
Somalis in many ways exemplify what the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees has termed “Global Refugees.” As noted above, as many 
as 500,000 Somali refugees live in what might be termed the “far” 
diaspora,28 with large concentrations in the United States (the largest 
communities being in Minneapolis MN Columbus OH, Atlanta GA, 
and Washington DC), Canada (Toronto and Ottawa the main centres) 
and Europe (the UK hosts 100,000–200,000 Somalis, and smaller popu-
lations are settled in Italy, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands). There are an estimated 30,000 Somalis living in Dubai 
and communities in other Gulf countries as well, though many have 
migrated as students or businesspeople rather than as refugees.
Other African countries with significant Somali refugee populations 
include South Africa (estimated 30,000 by December 2013) and Egypt 
(8,000).29 Many Somali refugees experience considerable hostility from 
host and other migrant populations in host countries who see them as 
competing for employment opportunities and whatever social support 
is available. They derive limited social and economic support from 
other Somali migrants.
Whether they are refugees, economic migrants or students, Somalis 
settled in the diaspora provide important resources to refugees living 
closer to Somalia through their remittance support. Remittances to 
refugees in the region are estimated at $1.3 to 2 billion a year and are 
received by approximately 40% of the population living in Somalia. 
Funds received are spent on essential household expenses such as 
food, education and healthcare. In a recent study conducted by FAO, 
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one third of remittance recipients reported that they would face food 
insecurity if remittances were to be suspended. Remittances also reach 
into the camps. In her 2006 study, Horst estimates that 10% to 15% of 
refugees in Dadaab received remittances. According to a later study 
by the United States Bureau for Populations, Refugees and Migration 
(PRM), more than one-third (37%) said they received remittance sup-
port.30
The lack of a telecommunications network in the camps in Ethiopia 
has been cited by refugees as a severe impediment to their livelihoods 
since they are not able to contact relatives to ask for help, and remit-
tance companies that rely on mobile telephones to complete transac-
tions are not able to work in the camps.31 In the DRC study, 10% of 
refugees in Ethiopia reported receiving remittances (most of these are 
likely to be refugees living closer to Jijiga in the east of the country).32
Since 2012, many diaspora Somalis have gone back to Somalia on 
reconnaissance trips, to check on family members and property, work 
in the new government or explore the possibilities of investing in the 
country. Much has been made of these returns as being indicative of 
a significant change in the security situation in Mogadishu and as 
evidence that conditions are now ripe for large-scale return. It should 
however be noted that most of these returns are undertaken by people 
who have permanent residence or citizenship in another country and 
usually are relatively successful economically. They have the legal and 
financial ability to come and go from Somalia (usually Mogadishu) as 
the security situation dictates. If security deteriorates they can leave 
the country immediately. Most would-be returnees from neighbouring 
countries who lack the legal and financial means to re-emigrate if they 
find return unsustainable would face a very different situation.
The experience of the wider diaspora shows that engagement with 
multiple places at the same time, the constant use of social and eco-
nomic networks across great distances and international borders are 
important individual and collective survival strategies upon which as 
many as 40% of the Somali population relies in one way or another.33 
Recognizing the importance of managing risk and improving resil-
ience by actively living in multiple locations, it is likely to be necessary 
to provide some guarantees for potential returnees to be able to come 
and go for a time until they are well established and the security situa-
tion in the country stabilizes.
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IV. Issues and Problematics Concerning Solutions 
for Somali Refugees
As noted above, return to Somalia has been hampered by the rapidly 
changing security environment inside the country as well as by lack of 
economic opportunities for those returning to the country. Return to 
Somaliland was relatively “durable” if measured from the perspective 
of whether or not people re-emigrated, and by the fact that Ethiopia’s 
refugee camps, including what was once the world’s largest refugee 
camp, Hartisheik, were eventually closed (although hosting of refu-
gees from southern Somalia continued and was scaled up from 2007 
onwards). However many of those who were repatriated to Somalil-
and and Puntland continue to live as IDPs, in tents with limited water 
and food supply, in impoverished conditions.
Resettlement of Somali refugees has been ongoing over the past two 
decades. Between 1995 and 2010, 55,422 Somali refugees were resettled 
from the region.34 The US has been the largest recipient of resettled 
Somali refugees. Other resettlement countries include Austria, Canada, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Resettlement is ongoing from all camps except those in Dolo 
Ado. As of mid-2012, DRC reported that 16,000 refugees in Kenya were 
being processed for resettlement.
Given the protracted nature of the displacement within the region 
has been the de facto outcome for many refugees. Those who have set-
tled outside the camps have established social ties and many have built 
viable livelihoods for themselves in their adopted country. However, 
host countries are cautious about large-scale local integration. This 
solution is thus potentially feasible for only small numbers of refugees 
for whom return and/or onward resettlement is not practicable, but 
only if other solutions are being promoted at the same time for the 
majority.
A study by the Danish Refugee Council in Ethiopia and Kenya in 
2012 found that one third of the refugees would, under conditions pre-
vailing at the time, choose to be resettled if they had the option. A third 
said that they would return to Somalia and smaller numbers said that 
they would like to settle amongst the local population. If security and 
economic conditions in Somalia improved, more than half of refugees 
consulted said that they would opt to repatriate.35
One of the main obstacles to return is the availability of farmland. 
The DRC report says: “A significant difference exists between refugees 
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who arrived before 2006 (40% say that they had access to land [before 
displacement] and less than half of them believe they would still have 
access to it) and those who arrived in 2011–12 (80% had access to land, 
with less than half believing they would still have access to it and an 
important [unspecified] proportion saying they did not know).”36
Given a lack of meaningful durable solutions among those most 
commonly advocated by UNHCR and host and donor countries, many 
refugees have been carving out a solution of their own based on cre-
ative exploitation of the opportunities presented by having access to 
transnational social networks. Remittances from relatives living in the 
“far-off” diaspora—North America, Europe, and the Middle East in 
particular—provides supplementary income support to those living in 
refugee camps and in local communities in the Horn. Those who are 
better off financially often manage to move out into the wider diaspora 
themselves and become supporters of those living closer to Somalia. 
This transnational community provides resilience and a risk manage-
ment function that enables people to survive in communities where 
employment opportunities are lacking, and for those living further 
away to contribute to and manage family matters, business activi-
ties, and even political engagement even while they live further away. 
Should large-scale return to Somalia become a reality, the involvement 
of the diaspora in helping to support returning relatives will be key.
Large-scale return will depend first and foremost on the ability of 
Somali refugees to return home in safety. This will mean an expansion 
of areas under government control, particularly into rural areas. It 
will also mean an expansion of government ability to provide services 
and protection to returnees coming to urban areas. However, in prac-
tice there is likely to be continuing and increased pressure from host 
countries and donor nations to find solutions to protracted displace-
ment and ultimately for refugees to return to Somalia. Balancing these 
pressures with international responsibilities to assure protection of 
refugees and returnees will be a major challenge and there is likely to 
be an important role for regional actors (IGAD and the African Union 
in particular) in this regard.
With the implementation of facilitated large-scale return, the ear-
lier-mentioned entrenchment of aid within the Somali economy would 
again loom large. Repatriation will bring needed resources to commu-
nities but will also create an opportunity for those who have become 
adept at manipulating, diverting, and benefiting politically and mate-
rially from externally provided assistance. Funneling of large amounts 
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of resources through governance structures will have to be accompa-
nied by financial accountability and the ability to take decisive action 
in cases of corruption or fraud without which the effectiveness of any 
return and reintegration operation would be hampered and potentially 
further insecurity triggered.
V. Conclusion
Displacement within and from Somalia is one of the longest-running 
crises in the world today. One in six Somalis presently lives outside the 
country. Host countries in the Greater Horn of Africa are concerned 
about the economic, social and political cost of continuing to provide 
protection and assistance to large numbers of Somali refugees. They 
are keen to see solutions which will diminish these responsibilities.
Many Somali refugees themselves desire to return to their country 
either permanently or on a part-time basis depending on their personal 
circumstances. Given also the different circumstances that have gener-
ated refugee flows, the different needs of long-stayers versus newer 
arrivals, the uncertain fate of the property that many have left behind 
in Somalia, the precariousness of the current security and economic 
situation in the country and the size and heterogeneity of the refu-
gee populations, varying solutions will have to be found for different 
groups of refugees, promoting return for some, integration for others 
and onward resettlement for still others.
In respect of return to Somalia, decisions about when to initiate or 
facilitate repatriation, how to balance properly the requirements of 
return with those of national reconstruction, about meeting the needs 
of vulnerable IDP and local populations, and how best to promote 
post-return social integration will be exceedingly complex. Creative 
solutions will be required across all these questions and about how 
to enable transnational social networks and mobility to continue to 
function. Clearly, every opportunity to facilitate return in conditions 
that are safe, secure, dignified and sustainable should not fail to be 
realized. At the same time, as long as the reality of violence, conflict 
and serious abuses of human rights continues critically to characterize 
the situation in Somalia, pressure to end protracted displacement of its 
thousands of refugees should be balanced with ensuring that a protec-
tion space remains available for those who will continue to need it.
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Timeline of Events related to Somali Displacement in the Region}
1977–78  Border war between Somalia and Ethiopia sent approximately 
650,000 refugees (Ethiopian Somalis) to Somalia
May 1988  Beginning of fighting between Somali National Movement (SNM) 
and Government of Somalia. Bombardment of Hargeisa and 
beginning of displacement of people to Somalia
1988–91 Influx of refugees from Somaliland to Ethiopia and Djibouti
Jan 1991 President Siad Barre ousted from power
1991–94 Self-organized repatriation of refugees from Ethiopia to Somaliland
1991–92  Escalation of displacement from South/Central Somalia to Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Djibouti
Dec 1992 US-backed Operation Restore Hope launched in Somalia
1991–92 Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps established in Kenya
1992  Refugee boat crossings to Yemen begin to escalate (jump from 
30,000 to 60,000 in one year); UNHCR opens assistance operation in 
Yemen for Somali refugees
1992–94  Cross-Border Operation for return of Somali refugees from Kenya 
to South/Central Somalia
Mar 1993 Emergency conditions in refugee camps in Kenya stabilized
May 1993 UNOSOM took control of operations from US-led UNITAF
1997  Repatriation from Ethiopia and Djibouti to Somaliland and 
Puntland launched (bulk of operation continues until 2000, small 
numbers returned until 2005)
Dec 2006 Ethiopia invades Somalia, ousts Islamic Courts Union
Jan 2007  African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) led by Uganda 
established
2008 Dolo Ado camps in Ethiopia established
Jan 2009  Ethiopia withdraws from Somalia, hands control to AMISOM/TFG 
forces
Jan 2011  Distress migration out of Somalia to all countries in the region 
begins to rise
July 2011  Famine is declared in 2 regions of Southern Somalia (Bakool, Lower 
Shabelle)
Aug 2011  Famine is declared in a further 3 areas of Southern Somalia 
(Afgoye, Middle Shabeele, IDP camps in Mogadishu)
Feb 2012  UN declares famine over, 260,000 people are said to have died; 
800,000 sought refuge outside the country during the crisis
Sept 2012  Transitional Federal Government cedes power to new government, 
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Where range given, mid-point used. Data missing for 1991 and 1993. b) Figures for refu-
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